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INTRODUCTION
War is a form of dialogue. Just as diplomacy is the art of communicating across national boundaries (usually with non-lethal intent), conflict is a blunt mode of intercommunity discourse. Fundamental to that discourse are the languages of combatants, their enablers, and innocent populations among whom they operate.
The role of two-way communication in modern conflict is vastly underestimated, as leaders often fail to acknowledge the intricate impact of real time human discourse -in both directions -on local populations. An effective operational commander calibrates the message he wants a particular population to hear, feel, and react to. He and his forces speak clearly in a voice, tone, and context the local constituency understands. They assess reaction on the spot. They seek to outsmart adversarial messengers attracting the population to the enemy cause. There is no way around the fact that language is the tool required to perform these operational tasks. Forces must constantly communicate, or perish.
Two consistent concepts permeate the discussion of foreign language skills in the U.S. military: language is critical and training is hard. As the military seeks to reconcile the inherent dilemma of a necessary skill that is difficult to achieve, a vast number of wellintentioned programs have been designed to overcome the deficit. 1 These efforts are heroic in their attempt to equip U.S. forces with the linguistic means to achieve operational (and strategic) ends; nonetheless, the United States has not sufficiently cracked the language barrier. Greater appreciation for the language gap is needed at all echelons, matched by more resources (time, funding, and senior-level advocacy) throughout the military establishment focused on language. The thesis of this paper is that the information superiority needed to achieve operational objectives in modern conflict requires a cultural shift beginning at the leadership level; all forces should be trained to some level of language capacity, and many more personnel should be equipped with highly tuned language skills.
The methodology of this paper draws upon perspectives from U.S. military personnel with field experience as articulated in a broad pool of literature on the subject. A natural emphasis falls on ground forces who interact extensively with local populations. The need for more language proficiency is apparent. Department of Defense sources are analyzed to assess emphasis on foreign language learning as a required operational skill. Analysis of current efforts to address the linguistic gap is accompanied by recommendations to overcome it. The goal is a general increase in language skills and a healthy balance of diverse levels of training. Comments from those with battle experience reinforce this point.
Language is critical on today
One commentator drawing comparisons between Vietnam and Iraq notes that "American cultural preparation," to include "an insufficient number of people with language skills" was a common factor in the challenges faced in both insurgencies. 2 Another simply states that "Foreign language skills are mission-essential for an expeditionary army," 3 while a Marine returning for a second tour in Iraq notes that Arabic "could turn out to be his best weapon" as he seeks to "use the language to prevent hostile situations from escalating." 4 The importance of language was not lost on America's historical adversaries, as the Soviets found language skills "especially important for officers stationed abroad" and key to their "principle struggle for the minds of men." 5 Language skills also strengthen bonds of understanding with coalition partners, who are vital to achieving operational objectives.
Language is not a mere convenience, but a matter of survival. One interpreter lamented that soldiers die because they misunderstand combat zone cultures and customs. 6 Many recognize that overcoming such communications barriers can be "the difference between life and death." 7 Although bland in its presentation of the need for language skills in the force, the doctrine of Joint Operational Planning (Joint Publication 5.0) notes that language and regional skills are "integral to joint operations," adding that "this forcemultiplying capability can save lives and is integral to successful mission accomplishment." 8 A skill that "can save lives" deserves more attention. Indeed, "In military operations, miscommunication…can generate animosity, or even lead to unintended hostilities." 9 "To know your enemy you have to be able to get inside his head, but you can't unravel someone's thought process if you don't speak his language or understand the cultural context." 10 That may sound intuitive, but it belies the fact that armies train how to direct fires much more than they train to communicate to avoid them. "Foreign language skills can be as vital to battlefield success as any weapon -but they're a lot harder to acquire and maintain." 11 One astute observer highlighted the need for "cultural intelligence" as a warfighting imperative. 12 Contract interrogators were implicated in the strategically costly man-made catastrophe of Abu Ghraib, which begs the question of whether better trained U.S. personnel with requisite language and communications skills might have accessed the needed intelligence from detainees yet prevented the disaster. 13 A higher standard should be expected of uniformed professionals with highly tuned cultural awareness. One can only imagine how many lives were lost as a result of this blow to American credibility in the eyes of the Iraqi people, and the world. The nation pays a dear cost for the lack of a professional communicative interface.
Language training is hard. The recognition of a critical need for language skills among U.S. soldiers does not make the training any easier. Those who grasp the imperative and try to incorporate training into pre-deployment planning invariably confront the difficulty of a complex skill set. Training schedules are already full to overwhelming, and language requires great amounts of time, mental focus, practice opportunities, retention exercises, and cultural understanding. With acquisition and retention of some of the more difficult languages almost a full-time occupation, one might easily despair that a language requirement for soldiers is simply too hard. Even for individuals with a clear aptitude that should be cultivated, the tendency is often to focus on other combat skills.
Commanders naturally resist time-and resource-intensive obligations to send troops for long-term language training. Some suggest that the active duty force is overwhelmed and seek more linguists in the reserves. A Colonel in the Army Reserve counters that language is not a part-time training function and distracts from other requirements during very limited reserve training windows -making the reserves poor stewards of language skills. 14 Quite understandably, no one wants an added training burden. The task appears difficult, but
American interests (and lives) don't afford the luxury of giving up.
HOW MUCH TRAINING IS ENOUGH?
Opinions vary regarding how much language training is needed to prepare troops for victory on today's "irregular" battlefield. Somewhat on the optimistic side, the Small Wars Manual of 1940 states that "knowledge of the character of the people and command of their language are great assets…If not already familiar with the language, all officers upon assignment to expeditionary duty should study and acquire a working knowledge of it." 15 The manual insists that a "satisfactory" level of problem solving demands familiarity with language at all echelons and emphasizes that along with learning the terrain in their sectors, infantry troops should "gain a working knowledge of the local language as quickly as possible so that they may dispense with the employment of native guides and interpreters." that training an organic capability may be a bridge too far ("there are never enough linguists") the COIN manual recommends that commanders "consider with care" how to employ scarce language resources, which "are battle-winning assets." 18 The relevant appendix focuses on how to improve communication through an interpreter rather than highlighting language as a training necessity. 19 In focusing on interpreters, the COIN manual unfortunately implies that language as a skill can be "contracted out" rather than being integral to the combat unit. Another commentator articulates the sobering reality -soldiers have little choice but to use outside interpreters because they "are not likely to encounter one" wearing a U.S. uniform. 20 Where the Small Wars Manual and the COIN guidance agree is in acknowledging that foreign language is vital to achievement of operational objectives.
Milan Vego's comprehensive treatise on operational warfare highlights "information"
as a critical operational requirement. 21 Vego stresses that time, space, force "and, increasingly, information are pivotal in making sound decisions at all levels." 22 Highlighting "human space" as operationally critical, Vego notes that information's "decisive impact on the application of operational art" is indisputable and growing; proper evaluation of key factors "simply cannot be done without accurate information." 23 Information logically connects with language capacity, the conduit for gaining or dispensing real-time situational awareness. Language unlocks the critical insights that give troops timely and battle-relevant information. It is a critical enabler of information superiority (or at least mitigation of information inferiority). A 2006 analysis of the primacy of information in war suggests that information is more important than fires in deciding many contests. 24 Striking a balance. Given the difficulty of training to the ideal of "every soldier a linguist" and the dangers of relegating language to a peripheral "contract" function, the challenge is how to strike a healthy balance. The answer lies somewhere in the middle, with some highly trained personnel literate in the nuances of the local language, many translators carefully selected as force multipliers, and all troops in the battlefield trained in at least the rudiments of culture and a few basic phrases in the local language, with follow-on training in theater. That balance, however delicate, can be struck if leadership properly focuses on this critical operational requirement.
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Train each tongue in the force. As a basic goal, some level of language skill, however remedial, should be a pre-deployment requirement for all personnel. In many units it already is. 26 Even if limited to a few phrases (related to cultural insights trained at the same time), basic greetings or warnings prepare each soldier mentally to acknowledge the foreign context within which he or she must operate. 27 In-theater training should build on this baseline capacity. Hopefully the ongoing consideration of language helps soldiers overcome the tendency to assume that "smart" people speak English in any countryallowing them to appreciate communication challenges and local perceptions better. Even an hour or two of initial training, if done in the right spirit and frequently reinforced after deployment, can break down stereotypes and gives soldiers a basis on which to function more smoothly overseas. 28 This simple training needs the reinforcement of leaders at all echelons.
Train some for fluency. For a certain number in the force -which should constitute an increasing number over time -language training should be extensive and rigorous. The force needs high end skills that can defuse tense situations and negotiate complex agreements. For these, the solution should involve a strategy "that acknowledges language proficiency as the most important component in a language dependent MOS [military occupation specialty] -the hardest skill to acquire and the easiest to lose." 29 Language may be these soldiers' greatest contribution to operational goals and require exhaustive training time. It need not be their only contribution, however, as they can also be trained in the soldiering skills that permit them to function as an integrated member of the fighting unit.
Since "it is easier to take a linguist and train him to be a Soldier than it is to take a Soldier and train him to be a linguist," personnel with a primary language skill should be welcomed as more than mere "linguists." 30 Their combined language and soldiering skills provide critical means needed by the unit to achieve operational objectives. Units can be virtually illiterate without them.
A range of skill levels. The linguistic skill range between those barely able to say "good morning" and the master linguist is vast; skills that fall anywhere within that range can be put to use accordingly. Those on the way to becoming proficient, and those who hit a culmination point in their language study with semi-developed skills can each contribute according to skill level. 31 The full range of skills is needed, including creative technological devices that might put basic language assets into the hands of deployed troops. 32 A broad range of native-speakers also helps a commander navigate the decisive points of a humancentric theater of operations. 33 Native speakers can bring to bear complex nuances about culture (and in the Arabic context, even understand the Holy Quran at a level that helps U.S.
officials engage Muslims more effectively). Such native skills create a common reference point for understanding the motivations of the other side; armies cannot expect to win hearts and minds without delving into the cognitive world which those hearts and minds inhabit.
The full spectrum of language and cultural skill levels fit into a "culture of 
34
Language has a role at all levels, and rather than despair at the difficulty of the task the Pentagon should embrace the opportunity to amplify information-based skills appropriate to the evolving nature of warfare. The bar should be raised wisely without overextending the force; but, it should be raised decisively to enhance both cultural understanding and language study. Just as one cannot truly grasp complex culture without some grounding in language, "it is difficult to speak a language if you do not understand the culture." 35 Putting the ROLE in perspective, the United States "can't afford to train every Soldier in the Army to be a certified linguist, but [the United States] can't afford not to have everybody in the Army understanding cultural awareness, and maybe some rudimentary language capability." 36 Leadership needs to shift the balance in favor of more, and higher quality, training. Indeed, "the right blend is defined as: some people have to be experts, and everybody has to know something." 37 All require constant reinforcement in the field to polish those skills.
Too many languages to train all. The scope of this paper cannot encompass the range of priority languages in which military personnel will need to be proficient in the future, but lingering operations in Iraq and Afghanistan certainly help define current areas of focus.
(One retired officer questioned the assertion that "language needs were difficult to assess" by noting that after years of OIF and OEF the military should "have a pretty good idea of what countries we're fighting in."
38 ) The languages of future battles are no more predictable than what precise platforms might best fight future wars, but that does not prevent research and development from moving ahead. Planners use their best judgment in assessing which languages to focus on and various initiatives to define priority languages help guide the selection. 39 The military establishment should invest in information-based skills as it does in technological upgrades, even if tradeoffs are required which favor enhancing the soldier's mind rather than enhancing his equipment. What America should fear is that "Sputnik moment" in which the scramble for Russian linguists caught the nation unprepared.
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HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
The imperative is clear: the U.S. military must be more capable of functioning outside of the English language to achieve operational objectives. In assessing how well the U.S.
military is doing, one finds a plethora of programs designed to help fill the language gap.
Good programs abound. From the resident language classes at the Defense Language
Institute to pronunciation tips on an iPod, the avenues for acquiring language are manifold and diverse in their intent. 41 Elaborate language learning efforts over time include the illfated Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) administered through college training during 1943-44, 42 training software from the "Rosetta Stone" language series available to soldiers over the Internet at Army Knowledge Online, 43 and ever-evolving attempts to provide pay incentives for language acquisition and maintenance. 44 Creative use of technologies can also lead to beneficial hand-held devices to assist in translation, and serious attempts to recruit native language skills through the MAVNI program (Military Accessions
Vital to the National Interest) help round out a rather thorough range of programmatic enhancements. 45 All of these efforts have merit and all are part of the solution. 
CHANGING THE CULTURE
A broad range of programs, however impressive, is not the key to success; critical are networked programs and training continuity that help speakers reach and maintain fluency over time, personnel practices that put an incentive on language learning and retention, integration of linguists into units (rather than viewing them as a "specialty" function peripheral to the main effort), and demanding that commanders consider language along with other operational functions prior to and during deployment. Awareness of the "language factor" is almost as important as the skill itself in focusing minds on operational objectives.
Programs are designed to be networked. A mindset of language learning is needed, which builds upon but does not end with the mere taking of language courses. No single teacher or textbook -no matter how well presented -is the sole source of good language skills. The diversity of circumstances in which language is used, multiple dialects, and situational adjustments make it imperative that language learners consult a diversity of sources, confront a variety of conversational situations, and absorb culture from more than one perspective. Rather than plugging one program or another into the training regime (as if checking a box), it is critical that military leaders inject an ethic of language learning into the full training spectrum. Commanders should seek out and seize opportunities for themselves and their troops to practice/develop/maintain language skills.
Organic capabilities are preferable. Frequent references to "linguists" in doctrinal publications unfortunately infer that language is a specialty skill to be contracted out or attached to the unit as a support function. 55 That said, organic capabilities have many advantages: they build unit cohesion by integrating language into the force structure; cleared personnel ensure better operational security; they allow a unit to interpret the linguistic cues of a situation directly, not through the eyes of an outsider; they increase the unit's awareness of the culture generally; they avoid reliance on an interpreter untested in battle; they bypass the dilemma of a translator's sympathies getting in the way of a conversation -or a translator whose ethnic background is offensive to one's interlocutors; and, they give authority to the voice of the speaker -who is seen as a core member and not a hired hand. Personnel practices can provide incentive. Language pay and increased promotion prospects offer incentives to invest time in language learning. Language skills pertinent to the "Long War" now being fought deserve particular incentive; competence in these tongues should be rewarded by increased promotions regardless of an officer's core skill set. 58 The assumption that Foreign Area Officers (FAO) or "linguists" are the only ones to be rewarded for language is simply out of date. For all personnel, "until language skills are as highly valued by service promotion boards as other tactical skills, soldiers will not feel compelled to learn and maintain such abilities." 59 Lt. Gen. David Barno (retired), with extensive experience in Afghanistan, declares that too much emphasis remains on "operational experience" when considering promotions; "promotions based on who racked up the most command time in combat may not yield the best strategic leaders of the future." 60 Officer development programs should incorporate language training. A career-long view is required to build, refine, and maintain expertise. Personnel rotations should also take language into account as a particularly valuable skill set, not sending qualified personnel to perform less demanding tasks. 61 A commander's best assets (such as high impact, low density language skills) should be arrayed in support of his operational objectives. Language is a scarce skill to be highlighted when available and cultivated when language-learning potential is discovered at all echelons. It should not be lost on military officers that language skills are also an asset in seeking post-retirement jobs.
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Integration of linguists enhances the team effort. Linguists, whether in uniform or hired by contract, need to be made part of the team as early as possible (with appropriate security precautions based on clearance levels). A combat unit would never go into battle without weapons on the assumption that it can hire skilled riflemen after the team arrives.
Unfortunately, many a combat unit has deployed without the basic skills needed to win - 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Some may pose the counterargument that language and culture are already ingrained in the training regime to the extent feasible. Indeed, programs are many and growing, yet they constitute mere lip service when compared to the magnitude of the human-centric operational objectives at hand. Senior-level advocacy is a key variable in elevating cognitive preparation to a threshold at which tongues, not lips, are in America's service.
The research associated with this paper found that a challenge as complex as equipping U.S. troops with sufficient language skills to meet today's political-military objectives does not hinge on programs alone, but on a military culture that recognizes the importance of communication in pursuing operational objectives. The goal is not to train all troops to be master linguists. The goal is a consistent training focus at all levels, both predeployment and in theater, to ensure that no one is totally illiterate on the battlefield.
Communication should be a mindset, not a mere training exercise. At the higher levels, many more qualified linguists need to be given the resources to gain true fluency and populate all sectors of the force -the more integrated the better. Long-term language training should be career enhancing, not a niche requirement viewed as a distraction from the main effort. Translators also need to be hired and deployed earlier, trained to understand military tasks, and more smartly integrated into operational units.
The answer lies in recognition of the true problem -commanders should stop looking for the structured solution and create the "command climate" solution. Doctrine should be more forthright in highlighting foreign language as a basic survival skill -right along with weapons training as an obvious operational requirement. These skills stand between U.S.
forces and their objectives. Promotions and pay incentives should reinforce the need for language skills -to include consideration of a rigorous language requirement for promotion to flag rank. Commanders should create (and be part of) a climate in which language is given a premium commensurate with its criticality to operational success.
